A very brief exposition of the meta-Platonic model
es: BrevÃsima exposición del modelo metaplatónico
Platonic ideals do have interest with regards to the way they can be used to analyse not so much the actual reality but thought in a semantically significative way. Specially regarding the problem of general and particular categories.
The Platonic ideals are valid then, relinquishing metaphysical pretensions (even if just for a moment). But the quality of perfection is problematic if the topography is not teleological, let us relinquish it too. Let us allow the totality of the variability in a system of possible mental objects. The Platonic realm expands, then, stretching a space of infinite size and dimensions. It does not only consist of perfect ideas, but also possible ones. The limit of objects conceivable by awareness is not known. An important component of perception, then, incorporates the possible qualia dimensions.
If we look at our space again we realise certain quite interesting peculiarities. In it we find all the possible human experiences (we could think of every object as a set of points in an infinite-dimension infinite space). We find too all the possible combination of the experiences. And even, all the possible experiences of a conscious being (including probably an object-idea analogous to the null-set). We find, too —and almost serendipitously— all the abstractions.
And here a number of things happen. When we talk about a Work, let us say, musical, philosophical, literary, what are we talking about? Certainly our words point to a specific object, to an idea. We could almost say a Platonic idea, but Plato's theory comes with undesirable and limiting teleological-moral metaphysical baggage, like we said previously. This applies even more when referring to grand concepts (let us exemplify, the Theory of Natural Selection, or similar ideas). The frame of this meta-Platonic theory allows us to understand what are we referring to (what mental object —in this (and all) case(s)— does language point to).
With this we have defined in a very broad way the space (referred to here as the idea space or Μ (uppercase-µ)) and the mental objects (also ideas or ℰ).
We can go to other analysis characteristics (we bring metaphysics back). We have described this space as infinite and infinite-dimensional. In this space, like in experience (and by analogy, evidently), there are objects that are more and less similar to each other. Clearly all sounds, exempli gratia, will have in common the being sounds, the same with images and colours (even the ones that are not inside our visual qualia domain —or, if it is the case, the experienced by different consciousness possibilities, the totality of the experienced (who could be different even responding to the same physical stimuli)—), this is able to be analogised ad infinitum.
Undeniably, some of the ideas will express truths or falsities (there is roughly one idea per statement —this is actually a much more complex subject, we will explain in more detail later). There is a set of ideas that express all truths (confer Wittgenstein's definition of the World). Naturally, truths are not all equal. Traditionally, the distinction has been made between contingent and necessary truths, drawing the boundary at some more or less arbitrary point without much clear consensus. Superdeterminism will reject the existence of contingent truths altogether. However, it is not controversial to say that —if we accept the distinction as valid— there are truths that are more and less necessary, and there is a spectrum of necessary versus contingent. It is doubtful that many people would consider logical truths as contingent, something similar happens with mathematical truths. On the contrary, those who accept the distinction see, say, historical events or everyday human events as contingent. The status of physical truths might be a little more controversial. Some physicists theorise even about a multiverse in which each parallel universe has different beginning parameters, which effectively sees those parameters as contingent. We see here the famous science tower, in which each science uses and is based on emergent phenomenon of the previous science (logic, mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, we could continue with anthropology, history, sociology, etc.). Notice that we talk about sciences as they attend the veracity of certain ideas in a specific domain. It is seen, logically, that each domain of the mentioned sciences is contingent on the previous one (it deals from emergent phenomenon of the previous domain). From that point of view, the dividing line between contingent and necessary looks even more arbitrary. ¿Why are logical truths really necessary? It would certainly look that way if everything we experiment depends absolutely on them, even without an ontological absolute necessity. This will not be obvious or straight-forward to think about and we will later develop it somewhat.
Every one of the mentioned domains of science can be thought of as an example context. Each idea-object is inside a certain contextual frame (the idea of the novel War and Peace presupposes the actual logical truths, etc.). If we go back to the image of an infinite space, we can see this contextual elements as dimensional layers (or spaces). The set of all true statements shares, then, the relevant contextual layers that make up the actual universe. The 'parallel' realities, or similar realities that share less contingent truths get progressively farther away, until, after the layer (shall we say space shaped by contextual dimensions) corresponding to mathematical truths (and even more, the logic ones) the ideas describe something completely alien to our universe.
It seems clear that we should theorise about an additional metaphysical layer, because the logic and mathematical layers don't seem to be able to explain matter, the material existence of space (it is not just an emergent phenomenon, even though it is explainable by them); there must be a series of metaphysical truths that shape logic, spatial existence, and, up to certain point, emergen phenomenon.
This is merely an introduction to the idea and not a precise definition, nor a complete description of the interests of the model. They are reserved for later examinations.